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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the contribution of additional factors, apart from monetary policy, to the 
stabilization of the economy observed in the US since the 1980s. I estimate a limited participation 
model with financial frictions, allowing for changes in the interest rate rule, financial frictions, 
and shock processes. The results confirm the well-known differences in the interest rate rules 
between subsamples. However, when monitoring costs are considered, these differences are much 
smaller. A comparison of fit across several specifications finds that a decrease in financial 
frictions was more important than changed monetary policy or changed shock processes in 
stabilizing the economy. These results highlight the important differences in the effects of shocks 
and policies between limited participation and sticky price models.  
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether the presence of financial frictions can help explain the reduction
in the variability of output and inflation observed in the US since the 1980s. In contrast with
the traditional view that assigns a dominant role to monetary policy, I allow other factors as
well, estimating the interest rate rule followed by the Federal Reserve Bank in the last 40 years
allowing for changes in the monetary policy rule, the degree of financial frictions and shock
processes.
The reduced volatility of output and inflation has been mostly attributed to the way mon-
etary policy was conducted mainly after the arrival of Paul Volcker at the Fed in 1979:3. In
particular, most empirical research identifies a different policy rule for each period (e.g. Clar-
ida et al. (1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1998)), reflecting a central bank more concerned with
inflation stabilization after the 1980s. But in addition to the improved policy hypothesis, other
authors ascribe this stabilization to more diverse sources such as the management of inventories
(McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000); Blanchard and Simon (2001)), good luck reflected in re-
duced volatility of exogenous shocks (Sims (1990); Bernanke and Mihov (1998)), and asymmetric
business cycles (Jovanovic (2003)), to mention some of them.
The present work differs from previous literature in the fact that financial frictions are taken
into account when estimating the reaction function of the central bank. Doing this is important
for several reasons. First, there is a wide literature which shows that financial frictions may
amplify and propagate the effects of exogenous shocks.1 Second, the effects of monetary policy
rules can be altered by the presence of these frictions.2 And third, because of the development
of financial markets, the degree of financial frictions themselves may have changed3, which
could alter the effects of exogenous shocks. Thus, this paper asks whether monetary policy
alone, as usually modeled, suffices to explain the Post-Volcker stabilization of the economy, or
whether other factors, in particular credit market imperfections, have also played a role in this
stabilization.
1See Bernanke et al. (2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), and de-Blas-Pérez (2003).
2See de-Blas-Pérez (2003).
3See Fender (2000).
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There are three main blocks in this paper. First, in Section 2 postwar US data are analyzed
to detect whether there is a clear breakpoint in the series considered. The breakpoint has
usually been identified with the differences in the conduct of monetary policy introduced by
Paul Volcker. Since there may be many other possible explanations for this breakpoint, here I
undertake a non-informed approach and perform stability tests on the moments of the series to
detect a statistically significant breakpoint.
Once a breakpoint has been identified, in Section 3 I set up a model of the business cycle
to replicate the behavior of the data. This constitutes the second block. I consider a monetary
economy in which some agents cannot access financial markets immediately in response to shocks
(limited participation), which allows money to have real effects. In addition, credit market
imperfections are added by assuming that the agents who produce capital goods face an agency
cost problem. This introduces a kind of financial accelerator in the economy. Finally, there
is also a central bank in charge of conducting monetary policy, which is assumed to follow an
interest rate rule in an attempt to stabilize both inflation and output. Section 4 defines and
solves for the competitive equilibrium in this model.
The third block of the paper covers the calibration and the results. I calibrate the coefficients
of the interest rate rule, shock processes and the degree of financial frictions for each of the two
sub-samples, in Section 6. First, I calibrate the rule and shock processes assuming that there
are no financial frictions and then taking them as given. Then, I also calibrate the degree of
financial frictions and check how this affects the results.
There are four results worth pointing out. First, the breakpoint for the series considered is
1981:2. Second, in the absence of financial frictions, the results confirm the widely recognized
change in the conduct of monetary policy by reporting substantially different interest rate rules
before and after 1981:2, but fail to assign more weight to inflation stabilization in the second
subsample. Third, interestingly, with positive monitoring costs the two calibrated rules are
much less different. That is, a smaller change in policy suffices for stabilization when imperfect
credit markets are considered, which may suggest a key role for credit market imperfections in
modelling the stabilization effects of monetary policy. When the rule, shocks and monitoring
costs are allowed to adjust between subsamples, the calibration reports interest rate rules that
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assign roughly the same weight to inflation and more weight to output stabilization after 1981:3.
Also the degree of financial frictions is reduced by 10% after 1981:2., which can be explained by
a development of financial markets since 1980s (Fender, 2000), and by policy measures favoring
the reduction of financing costs. Fourth, regarding shocks, money demand processes are found
to vary between subsamples, whereas the technology process remains relatively stable across
time, which is consistent with standard literature. The paper concludes with some guidelines
for further research.
2 Data and sample selection
To study the determinants of the changes in the volatility of output and inflation occurred in
the US4 the first question to answer is which point is the appropriate one to split the sample,
if any. Most researchers choose as breakpoint 1979:3, when Paul Volcker assumed leadership of
the Federal Reserve. That could be the approach in this paper, however there is an important
debate over the location and causes of this breakpoint.5 Therefore, I follow Collard, Fève and
Langot (2001), and identify the potential breakpoint by using a test for parameter instability
and structural change with unknown breakpoint.6 With this procedure, it is the moments in the
data that identify a breakpoint in the series, abstracting from any other consideration. This
identification is based on Wald, Likelihood ratio (LR) and Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests.
The variables considered are output, inflation, interest rate, and a risk premium measure,
reflecting the difference in the cost of external versus internal financing of firms, as an indication
of financial frictions. The period studied is 1959:4-2000:3. Data are obtained from the FRED
database at the FRB of St. Louis, and correspond to real GNP for output, GNP deflator index
for inflation, the federal funds rate as the nominal interest rate, and the difference between the
bank prime rate and the three month Treasury bill rate as the risk premium. Data are quarterly
and are first logged and then detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
4This phenomenon is also observed in other countries as reported by Cecchetti and Krause (2001).
5For example McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) argue it was due to a change in the volatility of consumption
and investment; Sims (1980, 1999) bases the change in luck; finally, Jovanovic (2003) atributes it to asymmetric
cycles.
6See Andrews (1993).
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Tables 1a and 1b report the results for the test statistics computed together with the esti-
mated breakpoint. When only the series of real GNP, GNP deflator inflation and the federal
funds rate are considered for the test, the statistics report noncoincident results. Moreover, only
the Wald test is significant. This statistic suggests a breakpoint at 1980:4, only one year after
the traditional Pre- and Post-Volcker sample division.
When the series of a measure of risk premium is considered together with those of output,
inflation and interest rates, results change as shown in Table 1b. The Wald test yields again a
change point at 1980:4. However, both the LM and the LR tests coincide in signaling 1981:2 as
the change point in the sample. This is the same point obtained in Collard, Fève and Langot
(2001). I will take as the breakpoint the one indicated by the LM and LR tests and disregard the
Wald test, since it often yields very large numbers and tends to overreject the null hypothesis.
Quarter 1981:2 could arise as a breakpoint for several reasons. This point remains close
enough to the arrival of Paul Volcker in 1979:3 to be consistent with the claim that it results
from Volcker’s changes in monetary policy. However, there were also crucial changes in tax policy
at that time (McGrattan and Prescott, 2003). The Economic Recovery Tax Act (also known as
ERTA), implemented in 1981 by the Reagan administration, lowered income tax rates, increased
investment tax credits, and liberalized the depreciation of assets. The fact that this breakpoint
is found after including the spread betwen the bank prime rate and the three month Treasury-bill
rate suggests that changed financial conditions are an important aspect of the breakpoint. But
this does not tell us whether spreads were changed more by monetary policy or by tax policy,
and does not rule out a role for other factors, such as financial innovation.
Using this breakpoint, Table 2 reports the estimated standard deviations and correlations for
the series on each of the two subsamples with the inclusion of the risk premium. It shows that
all the variables selected experience a reduction in their volatilities in the second subsample.
This is the case especially for output and inflation, whose variability is reduced by around 20
and 40%. Figure 1 plots the data reflecting the reduction in volatilities reported in Table 2.
The table also shows a change in the correlation between output and interest rates after
1981:2, shifting towards a positive correlation in which output leads the interest rate. This may
suggest a central bank reacting positively to output and inflation deviations from targets after
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1981:2. In addition, there is a negative correlation between output and the risk premium. This
negative correlation is interpreted as reflecting financial frictions: in good times, when output is
high, it is easier for borrowers to obtain external financing at a lower cost, and vice versa. This
is the stylized fact that underlies the mechanism of the financial accelerator that I use in this
paper.
Are these results very different from the ones that would be obtained by splitting the sample
according to the Pre- and Post-Volcker periods? Table 2 also shows the moments when the
breakpoint is 1979:3. It is worth noticing that the estimated moments for the first sub-sample
(1959:4-1973:2) are the same as those when the breakpoint is 1981:2. The differences appear
in the second sub-sample. However, the reduction in the volatility of output and inflation still
appears using this alternative split. Also, the estimates again show the negative relationship
between output and the risk premium.
Summing up, estimated moments of the data for the period 1959:4-2000:3 show that there
is a breakpoint in the sample at a point near 1981:2. This breakpoint is associated with a
reduction in the volatility of the variables considered in the second subsample with respect to
the first one. Given these results, the next step is to analyze whether the reduced volatility of
output, inflation and interest rates is due only to a change in the monetary policy rule employed
by the central bank, or whether other factors such as financial frictions, that alter the effects of
monetary policy, have contributed to this stabilization of the economy.
3 A monetary economy
The model is a cash-in-advance economy with two additional frictions. The first one allows
for the nonneutral effects of money by assuming limited participation of households in financial
markets. The second one introduces credit market imperfections in the production of capital.
The economy is composed of households, firms, financial intermediaries, a monetary authority,
and entrepreneurs.
The households, firms, and financial intermediaries in the economy are assumed to belong
to a family. This family splits early in the morning to play separate roles. At the end of the
day, they all gather and share all their earnings.
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3.1 Households
There is a continuum of infinite-lived households in the interval [0,1]. The representative house-
hold chooses contingency plans for consumption (Ct), labor supply (Lt), and deposits
7 (
_
Dt),
taking as given the sequence of prices and quantities {
_
P t,
_
W t,
_
M t, Rt,
_
Π
f
t ,
_
Π
fi
t }
∞
t=0 to solve
max
Ct,Lt,
_
Dt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−θt − 1
1− θ
−Ψ
L
1+ψ
t
1 + ψ
)
, (1)
subject to
_
M t −
_
Dt + W¯tLt ≥
_
P tCtNt, (2)
_
M t+1 =
_
M t −
_
Dt +
_
W tLt −
_
P tCt +Rt
_
Dt +
_
Π
f
t +
_
Π
fi
t . (3)
Here E0 denotes expectations conditional on time 0 information, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,
the constant θ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, ψ is the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages, and Ψ is a scale parameter.
The representative household begins time t with money holdings from the previous period,
_
M t. A fraction of these money holdings is allocated to deposits in the bank,
_
Dt. Additionally, he
supplies labor to firms and receives in return wage payments,
_
W tLt, that can be spent within the
same period. This wage income plus money holdings minus deposits is available for consumption
purchases,
_
P tCt, as reflected in the cash-in-advance constraint (2).
The variable Nt is a shock to money velocity assumed to follow a first order Markov process
given by
Nt+1 = N exp(εν,t+1)N
ρν
t . (4)
Below, I will use νt to denote log(Nt). In this process, N is the value of the shock in the steady
state, the autocorrelation coefficient is 0 < ρν < 1, and εν,t+1 is an i.i.d. normally distributed
shock with zero mean and standard deviation σεν .
The flow of money from period t to period t+ 1 is given by (3), which shows two additional
income sources at the end of period t. The household obtains interest plus principal on deposits
from the financial intermediary, Rt
_
Dt, where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate; and
also dividends
_
Π
f
t from the firm, and
_
Π
fi
t from the financial intermediary.
7Henceforth, upper bar letters will indicate nominal variables not normalized. Plain upper case letters will
denote nominal variables once normalized. And lower case letters will refer to the growth rates of variables.
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The optimal labor-leisure and deposits decisions are
UC,t
Pt
= −
{
UL,tNt
Wt
+ βE
[
UL,t+1(1−Nt)
Wt+1
∣∣∣∣Γ1,t
]}
, (5)
E
[
UL,t
Wt
∣∣∣∣Γ0,t
]
= βE
[
UL,t+1Rt
Wt+1
∣∣∣∣Γ0,t
]
, (6)
where UC and UL denote the marginal utility of consumption and disutility of labor, respectively.
At this point, it is important to define the two information sets that govern variables choice in
this model. In particular, Γ0,t includes endogenous state variables (the stock of money carried
from the previous period,
_
M t; and the stock of capital determined at time t − 1, Kt), as well
as the time t money demand shock to households, and the technology shocks at time t− 1; Γ1,t
includes Γ0,t plus time t technology shocks.
Equation (6) is equivalent to the Fisher equation in other monetary models, except that
expectations depend on the information set at t− 1, reflecting households’ limited participation
in financial markets. That is, households make their portfolio choices before time t shocks are
revealed, and cannot adjust their deposits again until the next period. This rigidity induces
the liquidity effect of a money supply shock on the nominal interest rate observed in the data,
because firms are the only agents able to absorb the excess liquidity in the economy after a
monetary injection. The central bank achieves money market clearing by reducing the interest
rate so that firms are willing to borrow the excess amount of funds (see Lucas (1990), Christiano
(1991), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997)).
3.2 Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous good in a competitive framework. They hire labor from house-
holds, and purchase capital, as inputs for production. Firms own no initial funds, so they must
borrow at the beginning of every period to pay the wage bill and current capital purchases. The
production function takes the form
Yt = F (At,Kt,Ht) = AtK
αk
t H
αh
t , (7)
where Ht denotes the demand for household’s labor, and Kt is capital needed for production. I
assume that αk + αh = 1, reflecting constant returns to scale in technology. The variable At is
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the technological shock, modeled by a first order Markov process
At+1 = exp(εa,t+1)A
ρa
t , (8)
with 0 < ρa < 1, and εa,t+1 is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ
ε
a.
The borrowing decision of firms is subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint:
_
B
d
t ≥
_
W tHt +
_
P tQtZ
d
t , (9)
where
_
B
d
t denotes the demand for loans from the bank;
_
W t is households’ wages; Qt is the
capital goods price in consumption goods units, and Zdt denotes the new investment purchased
each period (investment demand).
Firms buy additional units of investment goods, Zdt , in competitive markets that open at the
end of the period and involve firms buying capital from entrepreneurs, described below. Firms
accumulate capital according to the following law of motion:
Zdt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, (10)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and the subscript t+1 denotes the time when capital
will be used. The dividends firms distribute to their owners (households) are given by
_
Π
f
t =
_
P tYt − (
_
W tHt +
_
P tQtZ
d
t )− (Rt − 1)
_
B
d
t .
Firms maximize their shareholders’ utility. Since profits are distributed at the end of the
period, a firm values one more dollar in dividends at time t, by how much consumption marginal
utility households obtain at time t+ 1, by refusing this time t dollar. Thus firms maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
Θt+1
_
Π
f
t , (11)
where Θt+1 denotes the relative marginal utility the household obtains from an additional unit
of consumption at time t+ 1,
Θt+1 = −
βt+1UL,t+1
W¯t+1
. (12)
Maximizing (11) subject to equation (9), the optimal input demands made by firms are
obtained. The representative firm demands labor and capital, respectively, according to
_
W t
_
P t
=
αhYt
HtRt
, (13)
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RtEt (Θt+1) = Et
{
Θt+2
_
P t+1
_
P t
Qt+1
Qt
[
Rt+1(1− δ) +
αkYt+1
Kt+1Qt+1
]}
. (14)
Note that all decisions made by firms, unlike households’ deposit choice, are based on the
complete information set at t. Labor demand (13) is affected by the interest rate since it is paid
in advance. Capital demand (14) depends on expected inflation, on the price of capital, Qt, and
on the nominal interest rate, everything discounted by the marginal disutility of labor (12). The
left-hand side of equation (14) is the loss in utility a household bears at time t+ 1 if dividends
are reduced by one unit at time t to buy more capital. This is equated to the value of the extra
dividend at time t+ 1, which can be spent at time t+ 2.
3.3 The financial intermediary
Banks in this economy act as financial intermediaries between households and firms. The rep-
resentative bank collects deposits from households,
_
Dt, plus any injection of new cash from the
central bank,
_
Xt, and uses these funds to make loans
_
B
d
t to firms. At the end of the period, the
financial intermediary receives principal plus interest from the loans, Rt
_
B
d
t , and it pays back
principal plus interest due on households’ deposits, Rt
_
Dt. Implicitly, the fact that the interest
rate paid to depositors is the same as that paid by borrowers means that banks act in a compet-
itive market for state-contingent loans (that is, Rt is contingent on time t information). Profits
of the financial intermediary are thus
_
Π
fi
t = Rt
_
Xt. (15)
These profits are distributed to households at the end of the period, as seen in (3).
3.4 Entrepreneurs
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, live only one period, and
can each carry out one project that requires one unit of consumption goods. The entrepreneur
operates a technology that transforms this unit of consumption goods into
∼
ωt units of capital
goods. The variable
∼
ωt is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed in the non-negative
interval [1− ω, 1 + ω] , with density φ(
∼
ωt) and distribution function Φ(
∼
ωt).
Every period, after production takes place, part of the output Yt is transferred lump-sum to
entrepreneurs; this constitutes their net worth NWt. According to the data, NWt is positively
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related with output, and more volatile than output; the elasticity of net worth with respect to
output will be called ξ,8 so I assume NWt = Y
ξ
t .
To generate financial frictions, it is assumed that this net worth is insufficient for the en-
trepreneur’s project. Moreover, since entrepreneurs live for only one period they cannot accu-
mulate wealth.9 Therefore, they need to borrow the difference between their required investment
and their endowment, 1 − NWt. Firms are assumed to lend to entrepreneurs in a competitive
market, and to be able to deal with a sufficient number of entrepreneurs in order to pool their
idiosyncratic risk. In other words, firms can set up a “mutual fund” to lend to entrepreneurs.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the mutual fund is affected by asymmetric in-
formation. When they sign their contract, neither the lender nor entrepreneurs can observe
the idiosyncratic shock. Afterwards,
∼
ωt is revealed to the entrepreneurs, but the lender cannot
observe this outcome unless he monitors. Monitoring costs are a fixed proportion µc > 0 of the
capital produced. Thus capital production involves a costly state verification problem, which
is optimally solved by a standard debt contract, according to Townsend (1979), and Gale and
Hellwig (1985). In this debt contract, an entrepreneur who borrows (1 − NWt) consumption
goods agrees to repay Rkt (1 − NWt) units of capital, if the realization of
∼
ωt is good. If the
realization of
∼
ωt is bad, then the entrepreneur prefers to default. Thus the default decision is
determined by a threshold value
_
ωt which satisfies
_
ωt ≡ R
k
t (1−NWt). (16)
In the optimal contract, the lender monitors in case of default, and confiscates all the en-
trepreneur’s production, but nothing more. That is, entrepreneurs have limited liability.
To ensure that this debt contract is efficient and incentive compatible, the participation of
lenders must be guaranteed. The mutual fund will find it profitable to lend the entrepreneurs
as long as the expected return net of monitoring costs (at least) equals the amount lent:
1−NWt = Qt
{∫ _ωt
1−ω
∼
ωtΦ(d
∼
ωt)− Φ(
_
ωt)µc + [1− Φ(
_
ωt)]
_
ωt
}
≡ Qtg(
_
ωt). (17)
8This assumption is a reduced form way to deal with the fact that in good times investors end up with more
cash available than in bad times. This could also be done through a dynamic problem for entrepreneurs, where
net worth would be another state variable of the system, possibly different among entrepreneurs, but this difficult
extension is left for future research.
9The transfer they receive is taxed away when entrepreneurs die, i.e. at the end of the period, and then
returned lump sum to consumers.
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Here the left hand side denotes the amount borrowed by entrepreneurs, and the right hand side
reflects the expected return on this loan, net of monitoring costs.10
Also, participation of the entrepreneur in the contract must be assured. This means that his
expected payoff must (at least) equal the net worth he invests in the project:
Qt
{∫ 1+ω
_
ωt
∼
ωtΦ(d
∼
ωt)− [1− Φ(
_
ωt)]
_
ωt
}
≡ Qtf(
_
ωt) = NWt, (18)
where the left hand side denotes the entrepreneur’s expected payoff. This expected value includes
expected production of capital, minus what must be paid back on the loan, both conditional on
not defaulting.
This costly state verification problem is solved taking as given the sequence of variables
{NWt, Qt, R
k
t }
∞
t=0. From equations (17) and (18) above, it follows that
Qt =
1
[Eω˜t − Φ(
_
ωt)µc]
=
1
[1− Φ(
_
ωt)µc]
. (19)
Additionally, note that
f(
_
ωt) + g(
_
ωt) = 1− Φ(
_
ωt)µc,
that is, if monitoring costs are positive, µc > 0, part of the output is destroyed by these costs,
Φ(
_
ωt)µc, while the rest is divided between the entrepreneur, f(
_
ωt), and the lender, g(
_
ωt). The
number of projects undertaken, it, net of monitoring costs, constitutes the supply of capital:
Zst = it[1− Φ(
_
ωt)µc].
3.5 The monetary authority
In this model, the central bank is in charge of monetary policy. Without entering into normative
issues, I will assume that the central bank’s objective is to minimize deviations of output and
inflation from some their steady states. In order to reduce the volatility of these variables, that
is, to stabilize output and inflation, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate.
Following recent literature (Taylor, 1993), the monetary authority will be assumed to employ
a lagged Taylor rule in performing this task. The central bank will set the interest rate as follows:
rt = γ + γrrt−1 + (1− γr)(γ˜ππt−1 + γ˜yyt−1) ≡ γ + γrrt−1 + γππt−1 + γyyt−1, (20)
10Credit rationing issues are avoided in this setup since expected returns going to the mutual fund are increasing
in the threshold value
_
ωt. For more details on this see Bernanke et al. (2000).
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where rt denotes the annualized quarterly interest rate, 4(Rt − 1); γ is the long run value for rt
under no disturbances; πt ≡ logPt− logPt−1 is the inflation rate; and yt denotes the deviation of
output from steady state. Thus, the central bank cares about smoothing interest rates (γr > 0),
and both inflation and output stabilization (γπ, γy > 0).
The analysis has also been done for other types of rules, mainly forward-looking and current
or traditional Taylor rules. However, the model yields better results for the data with the
lagged Taylor rule. Besides, the introduction of interest rate rules allows for the existence of
indeterminacy and multiple equilibria depending on the coefficients assigned to the rule. In
this case, the use of a lagged Taylor rule increases the uniqueness area simplifying the analysis.
Finally, there is a practical justification for the use of this rule that is the availability of data at
the time of setting the interest rate.
4 Equilibrium
To analyze the general equilibrium I need to express the dynamics in stationary terms. Therefore
nominal variables are divided by monetary holdings at the beginning of period t,
_
M
s
t . For
convenience, I will omit time subscripts and primes will denote next period’s variables.
At the beginning of time t individuals take as given the state variables of the model (last
period’s money and capital stocks), the current money demand shock as well as the past history
of shocks. Afterwards, these agents decide how much money to put in the bank. After having
chosen deposits, the technology shock is revealed. Next, all other variables are chosen.
The state of the economy is (S, s) with S = (M,K), s˜ = (a−1, ν), and s = (a, ν). Notice
that households choose deposits before the current state of the economy is revealed, but after
observing νt. Therefore the deposit choice is made subject to s˜ = (a−1, ν), whereas the rest of
variables take s = (a, ν).11 This difference in shock information motivates the introduction of
the two information sets, Γ1 and Γ0.
12
The model can be easily solved by assuming the family structure explained in section 3.
According to this assumption, one can think of a representative agent of the whole economy.
The representative agent has m units of money balances, and k units of capital, let Si = (m,k)
11Note that s = (a, ν) includes s˜ = (a−1, ν).
12Recall that Γ0 and Γ1 include (S, s˜) and (S, s), respectively as already mentioned in Section 3.1.
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for the individual’s variables. The state of this individual is then given by the vector (Si, S, s).
Therefore the Bellman equation of this representative agent’s program is
V (Si, S, s) =
= max
D∈[0,M ]
{
EΓ1|Γ0
[
max
C,L,K′,H,Bd
U(C,L) + βEΓ′
0
|Γ1V (S
′
i, S
′, s′)
]}
(21)
subject to
M −D +WL ≥ PCN,
Bd ≥WH + PQZd,
M ′(1 + µ) =M −D +WL− PC +RD +Πf +Πfi,
Πf = PY − (WH + PQZd)− (R− 1)Bd,
Πfi = RX,
Y = AKαkHαh ,
Zd = K ′ − (1− δ)K,
i[1− Φ(
_
ω)µc] = Z
s,
Q = 1
[1−Φ(
_
ω)µc]
,
_
ω ≡ Rk(1−NW ),
NW = Y ξ.
Definition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a set
of functions (V, C, L, D, H, K′, Bd, M ′, P, R, Q, i,
_
ω, NW, W, Πf , Πfi) such that:
i) the value function V (Si, S, s) solves the representative agent’s Bellman equation (21), and
C(Si, S, s), L(Si, S, s), D(Si, S, s˜), K
′(Si, S, s), B
d(Si, S, s), H(Si, S, s), M
′(Si, S, s), Π
f (Si, S, s),
and Πfi(Si, S, s) are the associated optimal policy functions, taking as given the appropriate
information structure,
ii) the functions i, and
_
ω solve the entrepreneur’s problem given Rk, Q, and NW (determined
by equation (4)),
iii) the central bank sets interest rates according to the following rule:
r = γ + γrr−1 + γππ−1 + γyy−1,
iv) and finally, consumption goods, money, loan, labor, and capital goods markets clear, that is
C + i = Y,
M = 1,
D +X = Bd,
H = L,
k = K,
m =M,
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and
Zd = Zs.
Under certain restrictions, there will exist equilibria in which both cash-in-advance con-
straints (2) and (9) will bind for each state of the world. That is, whenever the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to these constraints and the nominal interest rate will be positive.
These restrictions must imply a positive level of deposits, and stationarity of shocks to assure
that cash-in-advance constraints will hold with equality in every state. In the analysis below, I
will focus on this type of equilibria.
5 Parameters of the model
The parameters of the model are β, θ, ψ, Ψ, δ, αk, αh, ω, µc, ξ, as well as the parameters of the
stochastic processes for the shocks (ρa, ρν , σ
ε
a and σ
ε
ν). I take some of these parameters from
previous business cycle literature and calibrate others to match some moments of US data over
the period 1980:1-2000:3.
Given an average quarterly money growth rate of
_
X = 1.2%, the discount factor β is 0.9926.
This implies an annual nominal interest rate equal to 7.8% at the non-stochastic steady state,
consistent with US data. The relative risk aversion parameter is set equal to θ = 2. The
parameter ψ takes the value 0.7, that is, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages
is close to 1.5. This value is selected somewhat high, but lies within a range which is commonly
employed in macroeconomic studies because it helps the model generate sufficient fluctuations.
The coefficient Ψ is normalized so that labor in the non-stochastic steady state equals one.
The depreciation rate, δ, is taken to be 2.4% per quarter. The capital share on aggregate
income, in the frictionless model is taken to be 0.36; this implies an αk equal to 0.3598 in the
model with credit frictions. This value takes into account that aggregate output, Y A, equals
output plus value added from the capital sector, Y + i[Q − 1]. Notice that in the case without
monitoring costs, the price of capital is one, Q = 1, and therefore, Y A = Y. Constant returns
to scale in the production function imply αh = 0.6402. The ratio of government spending over
output is taken from US data and equal to 0.21.
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Taking data on corporate profits after tax and US GDP for the period 1947:1-2002:1 I obtain
an elasticity of profits (net worth) with respect to output equal to 3.84. This is similar to the
value ξ = 4.45 assigned by Gertler (1995). I calibrate Rk to match a risk premium of 191 basis
points measured by the spread between the bank prime rate and the three-month commercial
paper rate on average terms. The bound ω on the support of the uniform distribution of ω˜t
is chosen to match an annual bankruptcy rate, Φ(
_
ωt), of 10% for US data from 1980-2001.
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The proportion of internal project financing, NW, is set equal to 0.15 as in Gertler (1995). The
value of monitoring costs, µc, is set equal 20% as in Fuerst (1995). This calibration implies a
threshold value, ω¯ of 0.8619, obtained from combining equations (16)-(19) in the steady state.
The parameters above have been calibrated to match first order moments. Next, the model
is log-linearized around the nonstochastic steady state, and solved. To assess the dynamic
properties of the data, the vector of the eight remaining parameters, ϑ, is calibrated to match
second order moments where
ϑ = (γr, γπ, γy, ρa, ρν , σ
ε
a, σ
ε
ν , µc). (22)
6 Calibration results
I will employ a method of moments for the calibration of the remaining parameters, those of the
interest rate rule, shock processes and monitoring costs, keeping the other structural parameters
constant. This method consists of choosing the parameters of the model that help minimize
the difference between the vector of empirical moments obtained in the data, M, and those
generated by the model, using the calibrated parameters, M(ϑ). The criterion is to minimize
the following loss function:
L(ϑ) = [M(ϑ)−M]′ ×W(M)× [M(ϑ)−M] ,
where W(M) is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the moments derived from the actual
data.
In the calibration, I omit the period between 1979:3-1981:2 of nonborrowed reserves due to
its high volatility. There is a wide set of moments to choose among in order to calibrate the
13US Business Bankruptcy Filings over Total Filings 1980-2001. Source: ABI World. This value is similar to
the ones provided by Gertler (1995) and Fisher (1999).
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parameters. I will employ those moments related with the interest rate rule and the volatility
of the main variables of interest. In particular, I will consider the following eight moments:
M(ϑ)−M =


σy(ϑ)− σy
σπ(ϑ)− σπ
σR(ϑ)− σR
ρ[(Rt, πt−1), ϑ]− ρ(Rt, πt−1)
ρ[(Rt, yt−1), ϑ]− ρ(Rt, yt−1)
ρ[(yt, yt−1), ϑ]− ρ(yt, yt−1)
ρ[(πt, πt−1), ϑ]− ρ(πt, πt−1)
ρ[(Rt, Rt−1), ϑ]− ρ(Rt, Rt−1)


. (23)
Thus, the parameters are calibrated to match standard deviations of output, inflation and in-
terest rate; the correlations between current nominal interest rate and lagged inflation and
output,14 plus the autocorrelations of output, inflation and interest rate. Each of the moments
is computed from data generated by the model using the parameters in ϑ, and detrended by the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, for each of the two sub-samples.
I consider first the calibration of ϑ′ = (γr, γπ, γy, ρa, ρν , σ
ε
a, σ
ε
ν), assuming that monitoring
costs take a fixed value, either zero or positive. The best match is given in Table 3, for monitoring
costs equal to zero and 0.2, the value advocated by Fuerst (1995). I report the calibrated values
for each parameter with standard errors in parenthesis. The right most column reports the
J-statistic resulting from the minimization procedure.
Note that when monitoring costs are zero, the difference between the two interest rate rules
for each sub-sample is substantial. The degree of interest rate smoothing is much higher after
1981:3 and also the weight on output stabilization. However, unlike most previous studies, the
model fails to report an interest rate rule with more weight on inflation stabilization after 1981:2.
Regarding shocks, both technological and money demand shocks show a high persistence in both
subsamples, with more variance of technology rather than money demand shocks.
When nonzero monitoring costs are considered, the differences between the two subsamples
are reduced. The degree of interest rate smoothing differs less between subsamples (and is also
smaller overall). The coefficients on inflation and output stabilization vary less, and the direc-
tion of change is as expected. Finally, shocks are still persistent in both subsamples but neither
14 It is natural to choose these lagged correlations since this is the form of the interest rate rule the central bank
uses in this model.
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the autocorrelation nor the standard deviation of money demand shocks is significant, which
may suggest that there is an identification problem with these parameters. Thus, the introduc-
tion of a positive level of monitoring costs yields interest rate rules more in line with previous
research. It also helps the model match the data since the J-statistics are substantially reduced.
Summarizing, introducing Fuerst’s value of financial frictions helps the model’s performance in
two directions. First, with the same set of parameters to be calibrated, the model matches more
moments than was the case for the version without financial frictions, and second, the calibrated
rules show a central bank more concerned with inflation and output stabilization after 1981:3
as in the literature.15
The next step is to allow monitoring costs also to be calibrated simultaneously with the other
parameters, that is ϑ = (γr, γπ, γy, ρa, ρν , σ
ε
a, σ
ε
ν , µc), . The resulting coefficients are reported in
Table 4. Choosing the best monitoring costs to match the data considerably improves the fit
in both subsamples. The degree of interest rate smoothing is higher after 1981:3, and so is
the weight on both output and inflation stabilization. In both cases, technology and money
demand shocks are highly persistent, with technology shocks being relatively more dominant
after 1981:3. Notice that money demand shocks are not significant in the second subsample.
Finally, the degree of financial frictions measured in this paper by monitoring costs falls by
around 10% in the second subsample with respect to the first, reflecting a reduction of financial
imperfections in time. The implied moments are reported in Table 5. The calibration of the two
subsamples matches within one standard error the targeted moments. However, the model has
difficulty in replicating the correlations between current interest rates and current and future
output.
6.1 Robustness analysis
In this section I study the robustness of the results to different specifications of the interest rate
rule. I consider a current and a forward-looking version of the rule followed by the central bank.
The current interest rate rule is of the form
rt = γ + γrrt−1 + (1− γr)r¯t, (24)
15See, among others, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).
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where
r¯t = γ˜ππt + γ˜yyt, (25)
that is, the central bank sets today’s interest rates as a function of today’s deviations of inflation
and output from their respective targets.
The forward-looking rule is of the type employed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000)
rt = γ + γrrt−1 + (1− γr)r¯t, (26)
with
r¯t = γ˜πEtπt+1 + γ˜yEtyt+1, (27)
according to which the central bank reacts to expected deviations of inflation and output from
their respective targets.
I estimate the model with these new rules included, and report the results in Table 6.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. I also report the calibration of the lagged rule
as a reference. The coefficients reported in Table 6 are γ˜π and γ˜y, where γ˜π =
γπ
1− γr
and
γ˜y =
γy
1− γr
, in the notation of Tables 3 and 4. Qualitative results do not change with the
specification of the rule. Absent financial frictions, the weight on both inflation and output
deviations are higher in the second subsample than in the first one. The degree of interest rate
smoothing also increases after 1981:3. With positive and constant monitoring costs, there is
no big difference in the weight on inflation stabilization across subsamples. When the degree
of financial frictions is also calibrated (which is the case reported in the table) the calibration
reports a central bank that assigns more weight on both inflation and output stabilization after
1981:3 as reported in the previous discussion.
7 Discussion of results
This calibration leads to several conclusions. First, the calibrated coefficients of the interest
rate rule confirm the common result about US monetary policy, also reported in Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (2000), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998). These authors estimate two interest rate
rules for US monetary policy in 1960:1-1979:2 and 1979:3-1996:4. They obtain two different
policy rules. The first one corresponding to the Pre-Volcker period has the nominal interest
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rate reacting slightly to inflation, whereas the second rule (Volcker-Greenspan period) shows
a central bank reacting more aggressively to both inflation and output. A similar pattern can
also be observed here. In spite of the use of a lagged versus a forward-looking interest rate rule,
the baseline calibration here suggests that the US Fed reacted more strongly to inflation and
output after 1981:3, consistent with previous papers. This change in the policy rule employed
undoubtedly contributed to the stabilization of the economy since 1981:3, as can be observed
from the implied moments in Table 5. However, the resulting policy rule for the second subsample
is not so aggressive as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) in that the reaction to inflation is
not so high. This outcome points to other factors contributing as well to the stabilization of the
economy. Another difference is that Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) do not obtain significant
values for the response to output deviations in their estimation. Here the calibrated rules do
respond significantly to output, a fact that is specially important in this type of model, as
explained below.
Second, the exercise reports higher financial frictions (measured here by monitoring costs) in
the first subsample than in the second, where they are reduced by around 10%. This reduction in
the degree of financial frictions is consistent with more efficient financial markets, suffering less
severe asymmetric information problems, since the 1980s. These results are in line with Fender’s
(2000) in that the wider access of small firms to financial markets since the 1980s may have
reduced the differences in firm financing reported by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993). Basically,
according to Fender’s paper, small firms would protect themselves from risks by investing in
secondary markets that became operative at the beginning of the 1980s, and therefore the
effects of a financial accelerator in this period would be smaller.
Finally, these two subsamples are characterized by different patterns of stochastic processes.
Money demand shocks are found to be dominant in the first period, whereas technology shocks
remain more or less stable between subsamples, which is consistent with previous literature. It
is worth analyzing this point in more detail.
In a previous paper, I showed that in a limited participation model, the effects of interest rate
rules are strengthened by credit market imperfections. That is, if the interest rate rule stabilizes
(destabilizes), it stabilizes (destabilizes) even more if there are credit market imperfections.
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Furthermore, the paper pointed out that the stabilization effects of interest rate rules in a limited
participation model are the opposite to those in a sticky price model. More concretely, following
an interest rate rule that reacts to deviations of both output and inflation stabilizes both variables
in a limited participation framework in the face of a technology shocks. However, in response
to money demand shocks, there is a trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation.16 Note
that in the calibration results, money demand shocks were relatively more important in the first
subsample, precisely when monitoring costs are higher. In the second subsample, two things
happen: monitoring costs are reduced and so is the standard deviation of money demand shocks,
helping monetary policy reduce aggregate volatility. This may have emphasized the stabilization
effects of the interest rate rule in this period.
Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2003) find that higher volatility in the Pre-Volcker era was
because the Fed gave a bigger weight to output stabilization before 1979:3. The explanation
they provide is that such a rule destabilized the economy in response to technology shocks. This
is because the framework they use is a sticky price model in which the use of interest rate rules
helps stabilize the economy in the presence of money demand shocks, not technology shocks. In
the calibration studied here it is still true that the rule before 1981:2 destabilized the economy,
but the intuition goes in a different way. Here, given limited participation, the rule became more
stabilizing after 1981:3 not only because the central bank reacted more to output, but because
there was a relatively lower presence of money demand shocks in the economy, compared with
the previous subsample. This emphasized the stabilizing properties of the rule.
7.1 Relative importance of rules, monitoring costs, and shocks
To conclude this section, it would be interesting to investigate which of the factors analyzed
above (interest rate rule, monitoring costs and shocks) that affected the volatilities of variables
before and after 1981:3 is most relevant. To this end, I perform three different exercises. First,
I calibrate the parameters in ϑ assuming that the coefficients of the rule remain the same across
both subsamples, while allowing monitoring costs and shock processes to vary. I will refer to this
case as Model 1. Then I hold the shock processes constant across subsamples, letting the rest of
16The different stabilization properties of interest rate rules in limited participation models versus sticky price
ones are analyzed in detail in de-Blas-Pérez (2003).
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parameters vary (Model 2 ). And finally, I maintain the same degree of monitoring costs across
subsamples, while the coefficients of the rule and shock processes change (Model 3 ). This will give
an idea of how much explanatory power is lost by keeping some set of parameters constant across
subsamples, and therefore which parameters are most important to explain the dynamics of the
data. In order to compare among the three sets of calibrations, I compute the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Information Criterion (BIC) to discriminate across models.
The results are presented Table 7 and the corresponding estimated moments appear in Table 8.
According to these criteria, the best model is the one corresponding to the lowest AIC or
BIC statistic. Keeping the same shock processes across subsamples implies the lowest statistic
in both cases, meaning that this model fits best. In the same line, the worst fit is the one that
maintains the same level of monitoring costs before and after 1981:3, suggesting that this is the
parameter where a breakpoint is most important. Finally, fixing the coefficients of the rule stays
in an intermediate place.
These results do not favor explaining the reduction in the volatility of output and inflation
after the 1980s entirely as a monetary effect. In fact, the results suggest that a change in financial
frictions was the most important factor in stabilizing the economy. The role of shock processes
across subsamples seems not to be so important in explaining the differences in volatility of
variables before and after 1981:3, in contrast with the literature that argues that “luck” was the
main reason for the change in volatility of output and inflation after the 80s.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether the presence of financial frictions, shown to affect the results
of monetary policy conducted by interest rate rules, can help explain the differences in the
variability of output and inflation between the Pre- and the Post-Volcker periods. The data show
a breakpoint in 1981:2, stronger when a measure of risk premium is introduced. In the absence of
financial frictions, the calibrated rules for each subsample confirm the widely recognized change
in the conduct of monetary policy by reporting substantially different interest rate rules before
and after 1981:2, but fail to assign more weight to inflation stabilization in the second subsample.
With positive monitoring costs the rules are much less different, suggesting that a smaller change
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in policy suffices for stabilization when imperfect credit markets are considered. When the rule,
shocks and monitoring costs are allowed to adjust between subsamples, the calibration reports
interest rate rules that assign more weight to inflation and output stabilization after 1981:3. The
degree of financial frictions is reduced by 10% after 1981:2. Finally, regarding shocks, money
demand processes vary between subsamples, whereas technology innovations remain relatively
stable across time, which may have affected the stabilizing objectives of monetary authorities
over time.
This paper is part of a line of research that tries to show the effects of financial frictions in
the effects of monetary policy. The analysis in this paper suggests there is a role for financial
frictions in the stabilization and destabilization of the economy. Therefore, the following step is
to study which is the optimal monetary policy in a framework when there are financial frictions
that amplify and to some extent also propagate the effects of exogenous shocks over the cycle.
Another important question to answer is whether central banks should react to asset prices of
any other indicator of financial economic activity. These topics are left for future research.
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A Tables
Table 1a: Instability tests (I)
Test Statistic value Breakpoint
Sup(LM) 19.4585 1976 : 1
Sup(LR) 14.6027 1976 : 1
Sup(Wald) 50.2388 1980 : 4
Note: The critical values for the test are 21.27, 23.65,
28.50 for a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
respectively. The number of parameters is p=9 and π0 = 30%.
Table 1b: Instability tests (II)
Test Statistic value Breakpoint
Sup(LM) 91.8293 1981 : 2
Sup(LR) 67.0669 1981 : 2
Sup(Wald) 107.431 1980 : 4
Note: The critical values for the test are 27.64, 30.48,
35.85 for a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%.
respectively. The number of parameters is p=13 and π0 = 25%.
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Table 2: Estimated moments
1959:4-1979:2 1981:3-2000:3 1959:4-1979:2 1979:3-2000:3
Value Value (Pre-Volcker) (Post-Volcker)
σy 1.5928
(0.2486)
0.9065
(0.1517)
1.5929
(0.2422)
1.3060
(0.3751)
σπ 0.2867
(0.0512)
0.1600
(0.0137)
0.2867
(0.0491)
0.1998
(0.0277)
σR 0.3820
(0.0571)
0.2643
(0.0354)
0.3821
(0.0555)
0.3655
(0.0550)
σrp 0.1394
(0.0296)
0.1354
(0.0306)
0.1395
(0.0284)
0.1332
(0.0319)
ρ(Rt, πt−1) 0.4123
(0.1060)
0.2360
(0.0768)
0.4125
(0.1008)
0.1390
(0.1131)
ρ(Rt, πt) 0.3170
(0.0789)
0.1722
(0.0968)
0.3171
(0.0783)
0.0767
(0.0936)
ρ(Rt, πt+1) 0.2313
(0.0907)
0.0586
(0.1342)
0.2314
(0.0960)
−0.0376
(0.1168)
ρ(Rt, yt−1) 0.1088
(0.0760)
0.4962
(0.0973)
0.1087
(0.0812)
0.1762
(0.0947)
ρ(Rt, yt) −0.1791
(0.1001)
0.3016
(0.1041)
−0.1792
(0.1053)
−0.1214
(0.1043)
ρ(Rt, yt+1) −0.3740
(0.1122)
0.1188
(0.1194)
−0.3741
(0.1169)
−0.2635
(0.1348)
ρ(yt, rpt−1) −0.5092
(0.0545)
0.2003
(0.1268)
−0.5092
(0.0600)
−0.1189
(0.1070)
ρ(yt, rpt) −0.2950
(0.0572)
0.2361
(0.0992)
−0.2951
(0.0616)
−0.0715
(0.0978)
ρ(yt, rpt+1) −0.0394
(0.0823)
0.2184
(0.0940)
−0.0394
(0.0828)
0.0007
(0.0758)
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.8650
(0.0242)
0.9067
(0.0163)
0.8650
(0.0247)
0.8667
(0.0216)
ρ(πt, πt−1) 0.5004
(0.1011)
0.2114
(0.0883)
0.5005
(0.1051)
0.2403
(0.0857)
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.8151
(0.0399)
0.8954
(0.0302)
0.8151
(0.0389)
0.7610
(0.0901)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3. Calibration results (I)
µc = 0 γπ
(s.e.)
γy
(s.e.)
γr
(s.e.)
ρa
(s.e.)
ρν
(s.e.)
σεa
(s.e.)
σεν
(s.e.)
J_stat
1959:4-1979:2 0.9928
(0.0000)
0.0741
(0.0296)
0.3441
(0.0973)
0.9347
(0.0158)
0.8699
(0.2757)
0.0702
(0.0386)
0.0070
(0.0035)
15.83
1981:3-2000:3 0.7577
(0.1427)
0.1421
(0.0259)
0.6760
(0.0869)
0.9967
(0.0326)
0.7528
(0.0940)
0.0329
(0.0184)
0.0043
(0.0009)
51.49
µc = 0.2
1959:4-1979:2 1.1132
(0.0000)
0.1044
(0.0262)
0.2371
(0.0269)
0.9844
(0.3823)
0.9978
(3.3521)
0.0043
(0.0006)
0.0086
(0.0094)
3.78
1981:3-2000:3 1.0749
(0.0000)
0.2139
(0.0287)
0.3327
(0.0479)
0.8175
(0.1692)
0.9999
(0.6513)
0.0022
(0.0005)
0.0025
(0.0015)
29.87
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. Calibration results (II)
γπ
(s.e.)
γy
(s.e.)
γr
(s.e.)
ρa
(s.e.)
ρν
(s.e.)
σεa
(s.e.)
σεν
(s.e.)
µc J_stat
1959:4-1979:2 0.9571
(0.2104)
0.0533
(0.0306)
0.3879
(0.1340)
0.9342
(0.0673)
0.9000
(0.3627)
0.0900
(0.0738)
0.0086
(0.0013)
0.0220
(0.0067)
1.28
1981:3-2000:3 0.9624
(0.0053)
0.1538
(0.0058)
0.4269
(0.0742)
0.9947
(0.3165)
0.9900
(33.01)
0.0900
(0.0302)
0.0003
(0.0106)
0.0199
(0.0008)
5.82
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Estimated moments (µc variable)
1959:4-1979:2 1981:3-2000:3
Data Model Data Model
σy 1.5928
(0.2486)
1.4660
(0.2486)
0.9065
(0.1517)
0.7770
(0.1060)
σπ 0.2867
(0.0512)
0.2689
(0.0512)
0.1600
(0.0137)
0.1431
(0.0107)
σR 0.3820
(0.0571)
0.3697
(0.0571)
0.2643
(0.0354)
0.2565
(0.0279)
ρ(Rt, πt−1) 0.4123
(0.1060)
0.4264
(0.1060)
0.2360
(0.0768)
0.2183
(0.0452)
ρ(Rt, πt) 0.3170
(0.0789)
0.5316
(0.0321)
0.1722
(0.0968)
0.2419
(0.0359)
ρ(Rt, πt+1) 0.2313
(0.0907)
0.8964
(0.0228)
0.0586
(0.1342)
0.5940
(0.0311)
ρ(Rt, yt−1) 0.1088
(0.0760)
0.1193
(0.0760)
0.4962
(0.0973)
0.4840
(0.0784)
ρ(Rt, yt) −0.1791
(0.1001)
0.3033
(0.0568)
0.3016
(0.1041)
0.6677
(0.0721)
ρ(Rt, yt+1) −0.3740
(0.1122)
0.3493
(0.0566)
0.1188
(0.1194)
0.7005
(0.0658)
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.8650
(0.0242)
0.8464
(0.0242)
0.9067
(0.0163)
0.8944
(0.0138)
ρ(πt, πt−1) 0.5004
(0.1011)
0.4591
(0.1011)
0.2114
(0.0883)
0.0521
(0.0690)
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.8151
(0.0399)
0.8137
(0.0399)
0.8954
(0.0302)
0.8595
(0.0185)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6. Alternative calibrations of the interest rate rule (µc calibrated)
γ˜π (s.e) γ˜y (s.e.) γr (s.e)
Lagged rule
1959:4-1979:2 1.56 (0.14) 0.09 (0.02) 0.39 (0.05)
1981:3-2000:4 1.68 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.43 (0.07)
Current rule
1959:4-1979:2 1.78 (0.00) 0.16 (0.12) 0.62 (0.12)
1981:3-2000:4 2.65 (0.00) 0.28 (0.14) 0.77 (0.18)
Forward-looking rule
1959:4-1979:2 1.84 (0.78) 0.28 (0.06) 0.60 (0.00)
1981:3-2000:4 1.46 (0.54) 0.32 (0.03) 0.49 (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7. Model selection 1959:4-2000:3
AIC BIC
Keeping interest rate rule fixed 0.1916 0.2089
Keeping shock processes fixed 0.1771 0.1932
Keeping monitoring costs fixed 0.2136 0.2334
Table 8: Estimated moments
1959:4-1979:2 1981:3-2000:3
Data Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Data Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
σy 1.5928
(0.2486)
0.6124
(0.1332)
0.4792
(0.1043)
1.2026
(0.1432)
0.9065
(0.1517)
0.5143
(0.1156)
0.6352
(0.0907)
0.7265
(0.1134)
σπ 0.2867
(0.0512)
0.1116
(0.0265)
0.0916
(0.0250)
0.2373
(0.0256)
0.1600
(0.0137)
0.1237
(0.0109)
0.1447
(0.0107)
0.1321
(0.0136)
σR 0.3820
(0.0571)
0.1929
(0.0334)
0.1659
(0.0288)
0.3259
(0.0340)
0.2643
(0.0354)
0.2572
(0.0273)
0.2375
(0.0229)
0.2670
(0.0273)
ρ(Rt, πt−1) 0.4123
(0.1060)
0.0059
(0.0344)
0.0951
(0.0373)
0.3656
(0.0367)
0.2360
(0.0768)
0.1185
(0.0579)
0.1715
(0.0573)
0.2022
(0.0571)
ρ(Rt, πt) 0.3170
(0.0789)
−0.0018
(0.0537)
0.1111
(0.0544)
0.4476
(0.0269)
0.1722
(0.0968)
0.1589
(0.0575)
0.1948
(0.0555)
0.2015
(0.0683)
ρ(Rt, πt+1) 0.2313
(0.0907)
0.5244
(0.0608)
0.6042
(0.0590)
0.8082
(0.0335)
0.0586
(0.1342)
0.6356
(0.0467)
0.6147
(0.0397)
0.5099
(0.0558)
ρ(Rt, yt−1) 0.1088
(0.0760)
0.3236
(0.0489)
0.3300
(0.0480)
0.1966
(0.0581)
0.4962
(0.0973)
0.5637
(0.0670)
0.3888
(0.0653)
0.5405
(0.0620)
ρ(Rt, yt) −0.1791
(0.1001)
0.5240
(0.0552)
0.5292
(0.0557)
0.3860
(0.0631)
0.3016
(0.1041)
0.7548
(0.0627)
0.5772
(0.0729)
0.7215
(0.0586)
ρ(Rt, yt+1) −0.3740
(0.1122)
0.5346
(0.0493)
0.5496
(0.0507)
0.4061
(0.0588)
0.1188
(0.1194)
0.7057
(0.0716)
0.6334
(0.0703)
0.7684
(0.0452)
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.8650
(0.0242)
0.7690
(0.0143)
0.7906
(0.0142)
0.8168
(0.0149)
0.9067
(0.0163)
0.8349
(0.0102)
0.8518
(0.0155)
0.8683
(0.0146)
ρ(πt, πt−1) 0.5004
(0.1011)
0.0856
(0.0647)
0.1259
(0.0510)
0.3986
(0.0554)
0.2114
(0.0883)
0.0867
(0.0758)
0.1046
(0.0653)
0.1193
(0.0771)
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.8151
(0.0399)
0.7774
(0.0122)
0.7857
(0.0140)
0.7759
(0.0150)
0.8954
(0.0302)
0.8432
(0.0153)
0.8313
(0.0131)
0.8708
(0.0119)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figures
Figure 1: The evolution of output, inflation, federal funds rate and a measure of risk premium
in the US during 1959:4-2000:3.
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